Corporate governance and real estate holdings: an empirical study of US firms.
Chu Kwok Hei Derek. === Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. === Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). === Abstracts in English and Chinese. === Abstract --- p.i === Acknowledgements --- p.iii === Table of Content --- p.iv === Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English Chinese |
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2006
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| Online Access: | http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5892954 http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-325648 |
| Summary: | Chu Kwok Hei Derek. === Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. === Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). === Abstracts in English and Chinese. === Abstract --- p.i === Acknowledgements --- p.iii === Table of Content --- p.iv === Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 === Chapter Chapter 2. --- Some Conceptual Issues --- p.6 === Chapter 2.1. --- PPE holding and shareholders' return --- p.6 === Chapter 2.2. --- Mis-management of Corporate Real Estate --- p.7 === Chapter Chapter 3. --- Determinants of Real Estate Holdings --- p.12 === Chapter 3.1. --- Growth opportunities --- p.12 === Chapter 3.2. --- Size --- p.13 === Chapter 3.3. --- Firm focus and real estate holding --- p.14 === Chapter 3.4. --- Level of Debt --- p.15 === Chapter 3.5 --- industrial effect --- p.15 === Chapter 3.6. --- Imperfect capital market and Real Estate decision --- p.16 === Chapter 3.6.1. --- Dividend payout --- p.17 === Chapter 3.6.2. --- Cash flow --- p.17 === Chapter Chapter 4. --- Measuring Corporate Governance --- p.20 === Chapter 4.2. --- Management ownership --- p.21 === Chapter 4.3. --- Outside Blockholder ownership --- p.22 === Chapter 4.4. --- Executive compensation structure --- p.24 === Chapter 4.5. --- Board composition --- p.26 === Chapter 4.6 --- DUALITY --- p.28 === Chapter Chapter 5. --- "Data, Sample and Empirical Analysis" --- p.29 === Chapter 5.1. --- Data and Sample --- p.29 === Chapter 5.2. --- Empirical Analysis --- p.31 === Chapter Chapter 6. --- Summary Statistics and Regression Results --- p.33 === Chapter 6.1. --- Summary Statistics --- p.33 === Chapter 6.2. --- Regression result --- p.35 === Chapter Chapter 7. --- Robustness check --- p.40 === Chapter 7.1. --- Full Sample Splitting --- p.40 === Chapter 7.2. --- Regression result --- p.41 === Chapter Chapter 8. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.44 === Appendices --- p.46 === Appendix 1 --- p.46 === Split full sample into single industry that sample size is larger than 30 --- p.46 === Appendix 2 --- p.52 === "Results after excluding firms in sector of Transportation, communication and Utility" --- p.52 === Appendix 3 --- p.53 === Non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and agency cost --- p.53 === Appendix 4 --- p.55 === Comparison of previous literatures-1 --- p.55 === Appendix 5 --- p.56 === Comparison of previous literatures-2 --- p.56 === Appendix 6 --- p.61 === List of Tables --- p.61 === Appendix 7 --- p.95 === Variables description: --- p.95 === References --- p.97 |
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