The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice
我們建立了一個簡易雙自我模型去體現直覺的現象: 即是知道但不知道原因, 並將該模型應用在一個管理架構內。在自我均衡中,我們表明信任直覺均衡,解釋直覺均衡,和謹慎均衡(即是,在不搜索證據下相信直覺,不相信直覺若且唯若找到替代證據解釋,和相信直覺若且唯若找到確實證據)如何在不同的參數範圍下出現。在首席執行官決定公司管理方針使用自由放任或是條例管制的人際均衡中,我們証明,當下屬找額外資訊沒代價時,使用條例管制會使首席執行官的收益弱變少;若下屬找額外資訊有代價時,有一個首席執行官會使用條例管制去引發下屬付出努力去搜索的均衡存在。最後,我們示範這如何用這些發現去解釋各式各樣以及看似相予盾的實驗結果,當中...
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ndltd-cuhk.edu.hk-oai-cuhk-dr-cuhk_12922922019-02-19T03:49:52Z The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice 我們建立了一個簡易雙自我模型去體現直覺的現象: 即是知道但不知道原因, 並將該模型應用在一個管理架構內。在自我均衡中,我們表明信任直覺均衡,解釋直覺均衡,和謹慎均衡(即是,在不搜索證據下相信直覺,不相信直覺若且唯若找到替代證據解釋,和相信直覺若且唯若找到確實證據)如何在不同的參數範圍下出現。在首席執行官決定公司管理方針使用自由放任或是條例管制的人際均衡中,我們証明,當下屬找額外資訊沒代價時,使用條例管制會使首席執行官的收益弱變少;若下屬找額外資訊有代價時,有一個首席執行官會使用條例管制去引發下屬付出努力去搜索的均衡存在。最後,我們示範這如何用這些發現去解釋各式各樣以及看似相予盾的實驗結果,當中有些支持直覺有利有些支持直覺有害。 We develop a simple dual-self model to capture the phenomenon of gut-feeling: knowing without knowing why, and put it into a managerial setup. Under intrapersonal equilibrium, we show how the Trust-in-feeling, Feeling-explained, and Discreet equilibrium, i.e. believing (in gut-feeling) without looking for evidence, disbelieving if and only if alternative evidence is found, and believing if and only ifconfirming evidence is found, emerge under different parameter range. In the interpersonal equilibrium in which the CEO decides company policy self-discipline, or rules, we show that, with costless search by subordinate, the CEO would be weakly worse-off if he imposes restriction on his subordinate action space, and, withcostly search, there exists an equilibrium in which the CEO would impose such restriction to induce his subordinate to make effortful search. Lastly, we demonstrate how these findings can resolve diverse and conflicting experimental results which gofor or against the ``usefulness of gut-feeling." Cheung, Hung Yui. Thesis M.Phil. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2016. Includes bibliographical references (leaves ). Abstracts also in Chinese. Title from PDF title page (viewed on …). Detailed summary in vernacular field only. Cheung, Hung Yui (author.) (thesis advisor.) Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics. (degree granting institution.) 2016 Text bibliography text electronic resource remote 1 online resource ( leaves) : illustrations computer online resource cuhk:1292292 local: ETD920180246 local: 991039385392503407 local: XM171116103506_0 eng chi Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons "Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International" License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/islandora/object/cuhk%3A1292292/datastream/TN/view/The%20%20Economics%20of%20Gut-feeling%20in%20Management%20Practice.jpghttp://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-1292292 |
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The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
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我們建立了一個簡易雙自我模型去體現直覺的現象: 即是知道但不知道原因, 並將該模型應用在一個管理架構內。在自我均衡中,我們表明信任直覺均衡,解釋直覺均衡,和謹慎均衡(即是,在不搜索證據下相信直覺,不相信直覺若且唯若找到替代證據解釋,和相信直覺若且唯若找到確實證據)如何在不同的參數範圍下出現。在首席執行官決定公司管理方針使用自由放任或是條例管制的人際均衡中,我們証明,當下屬找額外資訊沒代價時,使用條例管制會使首席執行官的收益弱變少;若下屬找額外資訊有代價時,有一個首席執行官會使用條例管制去引發下屬付出努力去搜索的均衡存在。最後,我們示範這如何用這些發現去解釋各式各樣以及看似相予盾的實驗結果,當中有些支持直覺有利有些支持直覺有害。 === We develop a simple dual-self model to capture the phenomenon of gut-feeling: knowing without knowing why, and put it into a managerial setup. Under intrapersonal equilibrium, we show how the Trust-in-feeling, Feeling-explained, and Discreet equilibrium, i.e. believing (in gut-feeling) without looking for evidence, disbelieving if and only if alternative evidence is found, and believing if and only ifconfirming evidence is found, emerge under different parameter range. In the interpersonal equilibrium in which the CEO decides company policy self-discipline, or rules, we show that, with costless search by subordinate, the CEO would be weakly worse-off if he imposes restriction on his subordinate action space, and, withcostly search, there exists an equilibrium in which the CEO would impose such restriction to induce his subordinate to make effortful search. Lastly, we demonstrate how these findings can resolve diverse and conflicting experimental results which gofor or against the ``usefulness of gut-feeling." === Cheung, Hung Yui. === Thesis M.Phil. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2016. === Includes bibliographical references (leaves ). === Abstracts also in Chinese. === Title from PDF title page (viewed on …). === Detailed summary in vernacular field only. |
author2 |
Cheung, Hung Yui (author.) |
author_facet |
Cheung, Hung Yui (author.) |
title |
The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
title_short |
The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
title_full |
The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
title_fullStr |
The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Economics of Gut-feeling in Management Practice |
title_sort |
economics of gut-feeling in management practice |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-1292292 |
_version_ |
1718978718725046272 |