Estimating Auction Equilibria using Individual Evolutionary Learning
I develop the Generalized Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Estimator (GENEE) library. The tool is designed to provide a generic computational library for running genetic algorithms and individual evolutionary learning in economic decision-making environments. Most importantly, I have adapted the librar...
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| Format: | Others |
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Chapman University Digital Commons
2019
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| Online Access: | https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cads_dissertations/1 https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=cads_dissertations |
| Summary: | I develop the Generalized Evolutionary Nash Equilibrium Estimator (GENEE) library. The tool is designed to provide a generic computational library for running genetic algorithms and individual evolutionary learning in economic decision-making environments. Most importantly, I have adapted the library to estimate equilibria bidding functions in auctions. I show it produces highly accurate estimates across a large class of auction environments with known solutions. I then apply GENEE to estimate the equilibria of two additional auctions with no known solutions: first-price sealed-bid common value auctions with multiple signals, and simultaneous first-price auctions with subadditive values |
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