| Summary: | In 1982, the New Zealand Meat Producers Board took control of all
New Zealand sheep producers' meat for export. Although the Board had
the statutory authority to control meat marketing when it was formed in
1922, this authority had not been exercised previously. The move
raised a number of questions, both with regard to the desirability of
monopoly control over export sheep meat : marketing, and the degree to
which the Board took account of producers' interests in this decision.
The stimulus for this thesis came from a well-qualified analyst of
the meat industry who commented that the one group within the meat
industry with the least understanding of, or influence upon, the Board's
decision to become the sole marketer of meat, was the producers. This
seems ironical when the Board is commonly perceived to represent
producers' interests. Thus, this thesis represents an attempt to examine
the evolving relationship between the Board representatives, and their
constituents, all sheep and beef producers of meat for export, between
1922 and 1985. In particular, it reviews the question of whether
the Meat Board's decision-making structure has provided primarily for a
representation of producers' interests and if not, why not? If not,
what other interest groups have influenced the Board?
In an attempt to answer these questions, it is argued that the Meat
Producers Board has, since its formation in 1922, developed in such a
way that it has been less able to fully represent the interests of its
constituents, meat producers. As Mascarenhas commented of producer boards
generally: 'though they derive their authority by statute, and have been established by government, they are less amenable to either the interests
of primary producers or the public interest'.
It will be argued that this development is partially the result of
the Board's evolving status as a corporate interest group where it has
had a close and continuing relationship with government. A useful
definition of corporatism as it applies to interest groups is offered by
Caws on: 'An organisation's capacity to represent its members' interests
and to discipline them as part of a negotiated interaction with other
groups'.
The Meat Board is formally recognised by government as the central
representative institution in the meat industry, but increasingly in
return, it has been required to consider a range of interests in the
industry before formulating its policy to present to government. This
is associated with the declining political influence of producers
generally, the Board's increasing commercial activities, and the
increasing political influence of certain vertically integrated meat
companies. Therefore while the formal responsibility and accountability
of the Meat Board has remained primarily to farmers, in reality they .are
only one of' a number of groups which the Board is obliged to take into
account in its dectsion-making process. Other groups with potential to
influence the Board include shipping lines, meat processors, and
exporting meat companies.
While the Meat Board's corporatist nature has strengthened since the Second World War under the predominantly National governments, recent
formal and informal challenges by the 1984 Labour government to the
concept of 'producer control ' of the various agricultural sectors, through
the producer boards, suggests the corporatist trend in the meat industry
could be in danger of breaking down.
It is not the function of this thesis to debate the political and
commercial advantages of 'producer control'. Rather it is to challenge
the common assumption of sheep and beef producers, that the mere existence
of a producer board secures their control of the meat industry.
|
|---|
