| Summary: | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University === PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. === My dissertation focuses on economic settings where agents have strong incentives to coordinate their choices. Coordination plays a prominent role in bank runs, debt crises, currency attacks, investment crashes, and sociopolitical change. In all these contexts agents may fail to take an action that would be in their collective interest because they are concerned that others will not do so. This study, assuming that the information is dispersed throughout the economy, proposes three models to analyze Delay (Chapter 1), Policy Interactions (Chapter 2) and Information Disclosure (Chapter 3) in such coordination environments.
Chapter 1 Leaders and Followers in a Speculative Attack. In this paper, I develop a stylized model of regime change in which agents are heterogeneously informed about the strength of the status quo and have to decide whether to attack it or not. There are two periods and two types of players, leaders and followers. Given some restrictions on the information structure, the equilibrium probability of regime change is univocally determined and it is higher if in the population there are many leaders.
Chapter 2 Debt Crisis: Central Bank and Government in a Global Game. In this paper, I study the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in presence of a speculative attack triggered by a high level of debt. The model explores the consequences of central bank and government choosing a publicly observable policy. Since policy interventions convey information that is relevant for the coordination game, multiple equilibria arise.
Chapter 3 Information Disclosure. In this paper, I analyze a model in which an authority has the option to collect and disclose information on financial intermediaries. Anyone who trades with a bank, would find this information valuable and would take it into account when deciding whether to trust the intermediary or not. Since disclosure creates common knowledge, in this model the interaction between the authority and the markets is characterized by multiple equilibria. === 2031-01-01
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