A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University === The purpose of this essay is to reply to the attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction made by Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and by White in "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism". This essay attempts to show...

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Main Author: Levy, Robert Jay
Language:en_US
Published: Boston University 2018
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29681
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spelling ndltd-bu.edu-oai-open.bu.edu-2144-296812019-03-19T03:23:23Z A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction Levy, Robert Jay Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University The purpose of this essay is to reply to the attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction made by Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and by White in "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism". This essay attempts to show not only that these attacks are ill-conceived, but also that Carnap's semantic methods can be used to explain analytically in natural languages. The two attacks are, in effect, attacks upon the conception of the analytic as being definitely different from the synthetic. Quine's attack is directed primarily at three of Carnap's basic concepts -- state-description, explication, and semantic rule. These he regards as separate attempts to explain analytically. White attacks the claim that some natural language has the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction of an artificial language. He does this by considering primarily two imagined experiments [TRUNCATED] 2018-06-26T15:57:43Z 2018-06-26T15:57:43Z 1963 1963 Thesis/Dissertation b14564361 https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29681 11719025488430 99191365430001161 en_US Based on investigation of the BU Libraries' staff, this work is free of known copyright restrictions. Boston University
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language en_US
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description Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University === The purpose of this essay is to reply to the attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction made by Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and by White in "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism". This essay attempts to show not only that these attacks are ill-conceived, but also that Carnap's semantic methods can be used to explain analytically in natural languages. The two attacks are, in effect, attacks upon the conception of the analytic as being definitely different from the synthetic. Quine's attack is directed primarily at three of Carnap's basic concepts -- state-description, explication, and semantic rule. These he regards as separate attempts to explain analytically. White attacks the claim that some natural language has the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction of an artificial language. He does this by considering primarily two imagined experiments [TRUNCATED]
author Levy, Robert Jay
spellingShingle Levy, Robert Jay
A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
author_facet Levy, Robert Jay
author_sort Levy, Robert Jay
title A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
title_short A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
title_full A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
title_fullStr A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
title_full_unstemmed A consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
title_sort consideration of two attacks upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction
publisher Boston University
publishDate 2018
url https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29681
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