| Summary: | Regulation is one of the broadest and most complex subjects of public policy analysis and, as such, it has been largely documented across academic literature and policy reports. It is often used to justify and explain government intervention in the face of market failures, which has influenced the way regulation is understood and implemented. Traditional approaches within the regulatory literature do not prioritise the process and outcomes of non-economic regulations, because not all policy goals can be expressed in terms of efficiency, utility maximisation, or through a cost-benefit analysis, but in so doing they underplay the shaping effect that the structure of regulatory governance and the interaction between policy networks has. This thesis then adopts a regulatory governance approach, with a particular emphasis on the role of regulatory oversight bodies in the regulatory governance landscape, particularly the relations they hold across policy sectors. By analysing the case of Mexico, and the oversight body in charge of promoting regulatory improvement, the research explores the asymmetries in relation to resources, expertise, and level of influence of economic and non-economic policy sectors. The thesis argues that there is a positive relation between stakeholder engagement and the quality of regulation. The research draws on a qualitative research methodology, particularly in elite interviews to tease out the nature of the particular dynamics underpinning the power relations involved. It concludes that regulation is highly relational, and implementing policy without taking into consideration the networked nature of stakeholders, along with their differences, puts at risk desired outcomes. In so doing, it argues that the failure to introduce a variegated approach to regulation in the context of both regulators and stakeholders, who command contrasting sets of resources and expertise, leads to a series of accountability failures.
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