Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin
This thesis aims to reinstate Foucault’s archaeological method for the purposes of legal theory. In defiance of its nearly universal criticism, I argue that the archaeological method maintains an overlooked capacity to provide a peculiar, historical, model of the “foundations” of law. In critical le...
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King's College London (University of London)
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ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-7549692019-02-05T03:27:08ZLegal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without originGibson, HayleyKletzer, Christoph ; Green, Penelope Jane ; Malik, Maleiha2018This thesis aims to reinstate Foucault’s archaeological method for the purposes of legal theory. In defiance of its nearly universal criticism, I argue that the archaeological method maintains an overlooked capacity to provide a peculiar, historical, model of the “foundations” of law. In critical legal circles, it is held that the law is radically without foundation: in deconstruction, law is the violent imposition of a decision that infinitely defers the coming of its own foundation; while the modern exercise of governmental power increasingly refuses association with a sovereign centre of authority as we shift into a “permanent state of exception”. This thesis questions both the truth and desirability of these conclusions by drawing upon a theme that links the unfounded law of deconstruction to the absent law of governance; namely, their shared understanding of “law” as a function of history. A study of the critical theory suggests that the unity and intelligibility of an order, the foundation and conservation of authority, inheres in a paradoxical relationship between past and future. In these theses, order may maintain itself by constantly pushing its fictitious origin into the past; or it may forcefully declare its future applicability. Each nomological moment therein takes the grammatical form of an ‘historical a priori’: a paradoxical motif which can, I argue, and in light of the fact that it subsists even in the most wholesale disavowal of a “Law of law”, have a legal life of its own. The ‘historical a priori’ in Foucault’s archaeology exemplifies precisely this autonomous character. In defending it, and drawing upon it, I aim to show that conceptualising legal ‘foundations’ in this historical manner, without origin, can reinstate the strategic momentum that has been lost in the wholesale destruction of origins; all the while retaining fundamental critical-legal, anti-Platonic and post-Sovereign principles.King's College London (University of London)https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.754969https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/legal-archaeology(3759df05-cec4-4809-a8c7-bbceb1028e30).htmlElectronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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This thesis aims to reinstate Foucault’s archaeological method for the purposes of legal theory. In defiance of its nearly universal criticism, I argue that the archaeological method maintains an overlooked capacity to provide a peculiar, historical, model of the “foundations” of law. In critical legal circles, it is held that the law is radically without foundation: in deconstruction, law is the violent imposition of a decision that infinitely defers the coming of its own foundation; while the modern exercise of governmental power increasingly refuses association with a sovereign centre of authority as we shift into a “permanent state of exception”. This thesis questions both the truth and desirability of these conclusions by drawing upon a theme that links the unfounded law of deconstruction to the absent law of governance; namely, their shared understanding of “law” as a function of history. A study of the critical theory suggests that the unity and intelligibility of an order, the foundation and conservation of authority, inheres in a paradoxical relationship between past and future. In these theses, order may maintain itself by constantly pushing its fictitious origin into the past; or it may forcefully declare its future applicability. Each nomological moment therein takes the grammatical form of an ‘historical a priori’: a paradoxical motif which can, I argue, and in light of the fact that it subsists even in the most wholesale disavowal of a “Law of law”, have a legal life of its own. The ‘historical a priori’ in Foucault’s archaeology exemplifies precisely this autonomous character. In defending it, and drawing upon it, I aim to show that conceptualising legal ‘foundations’ in this historical manner, without origin, can reinstate the strategic momentum that has been lost in the wholesale destruction of origins; all the while retaining fundamental critical-legal, anti-Platonic and post-Sovereign principles. |
author2 |
Kletzer, Christoph ; Green, Penelope Jane ; Malik, Maleiha |
author_facet |
Kletzer, Christoph ; Green, Penelope Jane ; Malik, Maleiha Gibson, Hayley |
author |
Gibson, Hayley |
spellingShingle |
Gibson, Hayley Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
author_sort |
Gibson, Hayley |
title |
Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
title_short |
Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
title_full |
Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
title_fullStr |
Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
title_full_unstemmed |
Legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
title_sort |
legal archaeology : towards an historical grounding of law without origin |
publisher |
King's College London (University of London) |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.754969 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT gibsonhayley legalarchaeologytowardsanhistoricalgroundingoflawwithoutorigin |
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