| Summary: | In this thesis, I compare the impact of processes through which India and Pakistan adopted their competition laws, on the subsequent implementation of these laws in the countries. To this end, I construct a theoretical framework by integrating principles from Legal Transplant, Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer and Development Economics literatures, which allows for the examination of the adoption process from deliberation to formal adoption through to the implementation stage, in a single continuum. I also develop a typology of mechanisms through which laws may be transferred, particularly from developed to developing countries. In reviewing the adoption processes for competition laws in India and Pakistan, I examine and identify the transfer mechanisms and political and legal institutions, engaged by the two countries. I argue that the Indian competition law, that has been acquired through socialization and by engaging a wide range of bottom-up, participatory and inclusive institutions is more likely to be compatible with the context of the country and to have greater legitimacy in it, than the Pakistani competition law, which has been acquired through coercion and by engaging only a limited range of top-down and exclusive institutions. At the implementation stage I focus on the independent performance of the national competition authorities created by the competition laws and the interaction of these authorities with the courts pre-existing in the countries. This analysis confirms that the Indian competition law is more compatible with and enjoys greater legitimacy in India than its Pakistani counterpart does in Pakistan. However, it also indicates that no transfer mechanism is unequivocally superior to another and that in settling upon transfer mechanisms and institutions for adopting competition laws, it is important for countries to understand the trade-offs they may be making with respect to the implementation of these laws.
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