Russia's crisis modernisation fallacy : an analysis of the 1998 and 2008 economic crises and their effects on the development of the Central Bank of Russia

This study argues that Russia's post-Soviet economic transition is not complete and is trapped in partial reform equilibrium: former command economy institutions have not been eradicated, and the required institutions for a market economy are weak or have not been established. Furthermore, this...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Everett, Rabekah
Other Authors: Sakwa, Richard
Published: University of Kent 2017
Online Access:https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.739503
Description
Summary:This study argues that Russia's post-Soviet economic transition is not complete and is trapped in partial reform equilibrium: former command economy institutions have not been eradicated, and the required institutions for a market economy are weak or have not been established. Furthermore, this study argues that economic crises have not catalysed or otherwise encouraged the economic transition, contrary to other scholars. Using process tracing, this is demonstrated through a case study of Russia's banking industry that analyses the Central Bank of Russia's responses to economic crises, and how these responses have failed to address the cause of the crisis. The study concludes that, as the Central Bank of Russia fails to fully address the cause of economic crises, institutions that would prevent further crises remain weak or non-existent, and a market economy does not yet exist.