| Summary: | The subject of this thesis is H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law. Two main arguments are made, firstly that there is a perspective through which Hart's seminal work can be purposefully read as an exercise in Ordinary Language Philosophy, which will dissolve many of the problems Hart's commentators encounter with his work. Secondly, that Hart's work is an exercise in Ordinary Language Philosophy applied to the problems of general jurisprudence. To effectively demonstrate the arguments, this thesis is divided into three main sections. Section A provides an overview of Ordinary Language Philosophy, grounding the thesis in its historical context. Section B is the main and most substantive section of the thesis, where the arguments are cultivated through an analysis of the main contributions in this area. Here, contradictions in the existing literature are highlighted, even amongst those who attempt to take the philosophy in Hart's work seriously. The final section, Section C, draws together my arguments and suggests scope for future research. The thesis advocates for a reading of The Concept of Law which would render it more relevant and immediate to the source text; something that has been lacking in the extensive contributions to the analysis of Hart's book since its publication in 1961.
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