A Rylean account of intelligent actions and activities
Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my vi...
Main Author: | Espejo-Serna, Juan C. |
---|---|
Published: |
University of Warwick
2016
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.694623 |
Similar Items
-
Russell and the metaphysics of neutral monism
by: Hamilton, John
Published: (2013) -
Freedom and fatalism in Wittgenstein's 'Lectures on Freedom of the Will'
by: Carter, Alexander David
Published: (2015) -
Freedom and nature in McDowell and Adorno
by: Whyman, Tom
Published: (2015) -
The philosophies of the later Wittgenstein and 'Being and Time'
by: Ladbon, Karim-Pasha
Published: (2002) -
Bertrand Russell's neutral monism
by: Ahmed, Mafizuddin
Published: (1968)