| Summary: | The thesis critically investigates the democratic quality of Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. I argue that there has been no systematic academic effort to empirically investigate whether CSDP is sufficiently democratic or not. By defining the democratic deficit as insufficient legitimacy and by using the method of triangulation of qualitative data (semistructur~ d interviews, Eurobarometer Reports), I empirically demonstrate that CSDP performs poorly in terms of both input and throughput legitimacy. Output legitimacy has been controlled for because it is impossible to holistically assess it due to the confidential nature of the policy. Drawing upon Foucauldian philosophy, I then argue that the poor legitimisation of the policy results from the specific form governmental power flows take in CSDP governance practices. Seeking policy efficiency and effectiveness, national and supra national rulers have disproportionately privileged the security of the EU citizens over their freedom to knoW about and participate in their own governance. This empirical analysis is supplemented with a normative claim, namely, that CSDP governance practices need to be balanced with corresponding practices of freedom. Drawing on an agonistic perception of democracy, I argue that EU citizens should know the details and potential of CSDP, hence allowing them to contest and decontest CSDP governance both indirectly - through their elected representatives and civil society - and directly - through public consultations and pan-European referenda. By having a say in the making of a policy of such great importance, EU citizens can gradually develop interdependent democratic subjectivities. The thesis concludes with problematisation about how active civic engagement can spill over European political integration through the development of an agonistic version of solidarity among the EU citizens.
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