The sell-out right as an agency control mechanism
This work seeks to demonstrate why current strategies aimed at limiting the exploitation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders in private companies are insufficient and argues in favour of the introduction of an agency theory-based control mechanism in the form of a sell-out right, under...
Main Author: | Boizard, Matthias |
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Published: |
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
2009
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.645874 |
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