| Summary: | The first chapter of this thesis explores the link between a government's political power and its choice between patronage and meritocracy in the recruitment and promotion of state bureaucrats. Evidence suggests that where political power is concentrated, governments are less likely to renounce patronage. A theoretical analysis suggests two reasons for this negative correlation. First, under patronage, governments can ensure bureaucratic competence only when they are powerful, while meritocracy guarantees competence regardless of the distribution of power. Secondly, a weak government introduces meritocracy to prevent the new incoming government from exerting its political influence over the composition of bureaucracy via patronage. The second chapter (joint paper with Maitreesh Ghatak) examines why not-for-profits are most active in mission-based sectors and why they are able to attract more motivated workers. Francois (2000) argues that choosing not-for-profit status enables the firm's manager to commit to a hands-off policy, and consequently to use worker's intrinsic motivation more effectively. However, it can be shown that this is not always in the interest of the manager and that it is never in the interest of the worker. Not-for-profits only emerge if there is an oversupply of motivated labour. The third chapter studies the role of political neutrality as a norm for state bureaucrats. The norm of political neutrality can be interpreted as an agreement to keep the bureaucrat's preferences hidden. Drawing on a theoretical analysis of the conflict of interest between bureaucrat and politician, this chapter shows that having no information on the bureaucrat's political views can improve the communication between politician and bureaucrat. This way, political neutrality can improve public decision making.
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