| Summary: | This thesis aims to make a critical inquiry into the concept of a moral theory in relation to the ideas of applied ethics and applied philosophy. It defends the general possibility of theories of morality and, in the course of the work, attempts to establish the conditions that such a theory must meet. Particular attention is focused on the ideas of explanation and the contribution of a theory to the criteria for right action. It argues that since moral theories are taken to concern how we should act, anything properly having that title should be determinate of right action. A detailed investigation of the (alleged) principal types of theory leads to the conclusion that, with one exception, these are not actually sources of moral theories at all. It is argued that there are good reasons for rejecting the exception on other grounds. The thesis concludes by looking at the implications of these claims for applied ethics, and tries to outline an account of this form of inquiry in the absence of moral theories. The account is one that may hope to assuage some common misgivings about the subject by exhibiting it as unified with applied philosophy, and philosophy in general.
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