Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects
Claims in the metaphysics of strong emergence, featuring autonomous and possibly reflexive downward causal capacity, methodologically require, though ultimately ignore, units of analysis qua unified wholes. I argue that this avoidance of mereological and wider metaphysical debates denies the metaphy...
Main Author: | Thebolt, Gabriel Arthur |
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Other Authors: | Durie, Robin |
Published: |
University of Exeter
2013
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.630855 |
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