Essays in mechanism design
In chapter one I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are willing to queue t...
Main Author: | Condorelli, D. |
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Published: |
University College London (University of London)
2010
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.625294 |
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