Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder

The self-concept can be separated into the physical self-concept (concerned with the self as a physical being) and the psychological self-concept (involving mental states, attitudes and beliefs). People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to have an intact physical self-concept and an im...

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Main Author: Grisdale, Emma Elizabeth
Published: Durham University 2014
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Online Access:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.620785
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spelling ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-6207852017-02-17T03:22:56ZDimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorderGrisdale, Emma Elizabeth2014The self-concept can be separated into the physical self-concept (concerned with the self as a physical being) and the psychological self-concept (involving mental states, attitudes and beliefs). People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to have an intact physical self-concept and an impaired psychological self-concept. Very little experimental work has previously been conducted directly comparing the physical and psychological self-concepts in ASD. This comparison is the primary aim of this thesis. Chapters 1-3 utilise a self-referencing paradigm to investigate the strength of the self-referencing effect in relation to the physical and psychological self-concepts. Chapter 1 demonstrates the presence of the self-reference effect in typically developing adults in both physical and psychological domains. Chapter 2 shows that adults with ASD display self-referencing effect in both domains, while chapter 3 demonstrates that children with ASD (aged 8 – 10) show the self-referencing effect in the physical domain only. Chapter 4 sought to verify the existence of an unimpaired physical self-concept in ASD using the rubber hand illusion. Children with ASD performed at the same level as a comparison group. Chapters 5 and 6 used an autobiographical memory interview and a self-description task respectively to compare and contrast the physical and psychological self-concepts in ASD. On both these tasks, participants with ASD displayed impairments in the psychological domain only. Chapter 7 concentrates on the psychological self-concept alone and investigates the ownership effect in ASD. It was found that participants with ASD were impaired on this task. Overall, the results presented here seem to support the idea that the psychological self-concept is impaired in ASD, while the physical self-concept remains intact. These are some of the first studies to directly compare the strength of the physical and psychological self-concept in ASD.616.85Durham Universityhttp://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.620785http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10750/Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
collection NDLTD
sources NDLTD
topic 616.85
spellingShingle 616.85
Grisdale, Emma Elizabeth
Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
description The self-concept can be separated into the physical self-concept (concerned with the self as a physical being) and the psychological self-concept (involving mental states, attitudes and beliefs). People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to have an intact physical self-concept and an impaired psychological self-concept. Very little experimental work has previously been conducted directly comparing the physical and psychological self-concepts in ASD. This comparison is the primary aim of this thesis. Chapters 1-3 utilise a self-referencing paradigm to investigate the strength of the self-referencing effect in relation to the physical and psychological self-concepts. Chapter 1 demonstrates the presence of the self-reference effect in typically developing adults in both physical and psychological domains. Chapter 2 shows that adults with ASD display self-referencing effect in both domains, while chapter 3 demonstrates that children with ASD (aged 8 – 10) show the self-referencing effect in the physical domain only. Chapter 4 sought to verify the existence of an unimpaired physical self-concept in ASD using the rubber hand illusion. Children with ASD performed at the same level as a comparison group. Chapters 5 and 6 used an autobiographical memory interview and a self-description task respectively to compare and contrast the physical and psychological self-concepts in ASD. On both these tasks, participants with ASD displayed impairments in the psychological domain only. Chapter 7 concentrates on the psychological self-concept alone and investigates the ownership effect in ASD. It was found that participants with ASD were impaired on this task. Overall, the results presented here seem to support the idea that the psychological self-concept is impaired in ASD, while the physical self-concept remains intact. These are some of the first studies to directly compare the strength of the physical and psychological self-concept in ASD.
author Grisdale, Emma Elizabeth
author_facet Grisdale, Emma Elizabeth
author_sort Grisdale, Emma Elizabeth
title Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
title_short Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
title_full Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
title_fullStr Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
title_full_unstemmed Dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
title_sort dimensions of the self-concept in autism spectrum disorder
publisher Durham University
publishDate 2014
url http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.620785
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