Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement
This thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The first essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means of a theoretical model the effect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experi...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Published: |
University of East Anglia
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614612 |
| id |
ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-614612 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-6146122016-08-04T03:58:09ZFour essays on optimal antitrust enforcementWandschneider, Frederick2014This thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The first essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means of a theoretical model the effect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experimental investigation of the former, and examines in particular the effects on cartel formation, prices and stability. The third essay experimentally explores the substitutability of antitrust detection rates and fines, and test whether different fine and detection rate combinations with constant expected fines achieve an equal level of deterrence. Lastly, the final essay discusses the role of antitrust enforcement on collusion when firms can engage in avoidance activities.330University of East Angliahttp://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614612https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/49483/Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| collection |
NDLTD |
| sources |
NDLTD |
| topic |
330 |
| spellingShingle |
330 Wandschneider, Frederick Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| description |
This thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The first essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means of a theoretical model the effect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experimental investigation of the former, and examines in particular the effects on cartel formation, prices and stability. The third essay experimentally explores the substitutability of antitrust detection rates and fines, and test whether different fine and detection rate combinations with constant expected fines achieve an equal level of deterrence. Lastly, the final essay discusses the role of antitrust enforcement on collusion when firms can engage in avoidance activities. |
| author |
Wandschneider, Frederick |
| author_facet |
Wandschneider, Frederick |
| author_sort |
Wandschneider, Frederick |
| title |
Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| title_short |
Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| title_full |
Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| title_fullStr |
Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| title_sort |
four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement |
| publisher |
University of East Anglia |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614612 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT wandschneiderfrederick fouressaysonoptimalantitrustenforcement |
| _version_ |
1718372248871501824 |