| Summary: | This thesis seeks to shed light on the intricate relationships holding between the various explanatory frameworks currently used within cognitive science. The driving question of this philosophical investigation concerns the nature and structure of cognitive explanation. More specifically, I attempt to clarify whether the sort of scientific explanations proposed for various cognitive phenomena at different levels of analysis or abstraction differ in significant ways from the explanations offered in other areas of scientific inquiry, such as biology, chemistry, or even physics. Thus, what I will call the problem of cognitive explanation, asks whether there is a distinctive feature that characterises cognitive explanations and distinguishes them from the explanatory schemas utilised in other scientific domains. I argue that the explanatory pluralism encountered within the daily practice of cognitive scientists has an essential normative dimension. The task of this thesis is to demonstrate that pluralism is an appropriate standard for the general explanatory project associated with cognitive science, which further implies defending and promoting the development of multiple explanatory schemas in the empirical study of cognitive phenomena.
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