| Summary: | This thesis is concerned with the 'Limit View' account of the nature of properties, first advanced by C. B. Martin, which holds that all real properties contribute to both the dispositional and the qualitative natures of the objects by which they are instantiated. According to the Limit View, the dispositional is identical to the qualitative, and both are identical to a single, unitary property. This distinctive position in the debate concerning the relative status of dispositional and categorical/qualitative properties has been charged with obscurity. This charge arises, in part, due to the manner in which Martin presented the view, and in part due to its standing in stark contrast to orthodox positions in the debate. In order to meet this charge, the aims of the first half of this thesis are threefold: first, to present a clear and thorough examination of the development and content of the Limit View as presented by Martin; second, to examine the Limit View in light of criticisms levelled against it and to defend it from such criticism; and, third, to present a viable and consistent, critical interpretation of the Limit View. Following this, the interpretation of the Limit View advanced in the first half of the thesis is applied to the debate concerning the ontology of mind and body. New responses to the Argument from Conceivability and the Knowledge Argument are developed; and what it means to characterise an entity as 'physical' or 'mental' is investigated. Based on the findings of this investigation, I argue that, if one accepts the Limit View, the position one should adopt concerning the ontology of mind and body is a new variant of neutral monism, which is outlined and distinguished from other positions in the debate in the final chapter of this thesis.
|
|---|
