Signals in two-sided search
We introduce signals to search models of two-sided matching markets and explore the implications for efficiency. In a labour market model in which firms can advertise wages and workers can choose effort, we find that advertisements can help overcome the Diamond paradox. Advertisements fix workers...
Main Author: | Poeschel, Friedrich Gerd |
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Other Authors: | Keller, Godfrey : Postel-Vinay, Fabien |
Published: |
University of Oxford
2011
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567826 |
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