| Summary: | The central preoccupation of this work is the hypothesis that economic power (resting also on non-economic bases) has been an important factoring explaining the ability of states in the recent past to achieve their foreign policy objectives. In addition, the hypothesis that economic considerations have also loomed large amongst these objectives themselves is investigated, especially since the extent to which this has-been the case is likely to have influenced the efficacy of economic pressure in diplomacy. By way of introduction, the principal extant theories bearing on these issues are subjected to exegisis and criticism. It is then argued that economic considerations represented a higher priority in British foreign policy in the later 1950s and early 1960s than is sometimes supposed, following which detailed attention is given to the political economy of Anglo-South African relations at the two historical junctures indicated in the title, For this purpose a vital distinction between 'putative' and 'actualized' economic power is employed. The essence of the argument is that, whilst on both occasions the British and South African governments were each economically dependent upon the other (in the sense that each was theoretically in a position to grant or withhold economic favours in urgent demand and unobtainable elsewhere), the South African government was able to transform this into putative economic power vis-a-vis Britain as a result of a marked superiority in the non-economic bases of such power. This power, it is finally argued, was 'actualized' in the extraction of political and security concessions from Britain on the occasions in question. Of particular significance in this connection was South Africa's new-mined gold. Both main hypothesis are thus held to be valid for the historical relationships studied. By way of conclusion, the arguments are summarised and the method defended.
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