| Summary: | After more than a century debate on the matter, privacy remains a subject of discussion. The problem with the definition of privacy and lack of certainty of its scope are among the grounds cited to oppose the notion of privacy. Hence the thesis re-examines these aspects and offers the proper definition of privacy and the two conjunctive touchstones that, when read with the limitations, establish the clear parameter of privacy. In England, the subject is shadowed by the fallacy that what worth protection of privacy is adequately covered by the existing legal principles most notably that of the principle of confidence. As such the thesis analyses the two hand in hand and shows how privacy differs in scope and context from the principle of confidence. The more recent judiciary attitudes on the matter, both in England and Malaysia, are discussed along with relevant legislative provisions to ultimately show that despite the English Court of Appeal unanimous pronouncement in 1991 as so affirmed by the British House of Lords in 2003 that the English law does not recognize a general right to privacy, the principle that had conveniently been applied by the High Court of Malaya in December 2001, in both legal system there exist relevant legislative provisions that can be interpreted so as to provide the basis for privacy as a matter of individuals' human right to freedom of private life.
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