Economy and the distribution of reflexives

• Main Author: Shiraki, Hitoshi
• Published: University College London (University of London) 2006
• Subjects: 415.0182
• Online Access: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.438214

This dissertation is a cross-linguistic discussion of the distribution of reflexives within the framework of generative grammar. The languages dealt with are mainly Dutch, English and Japanese, although other languages are also referred to. The aim of the dissertation is to make a contribution to an economy-based analysis of binding. First, it develops a novel analysis of the syntax of anaphoric binding. Second, it evaluates the adequacy of the cross-modular economy condition of Reuland (2001) and suggests a modification of it that accounts for cases where the effects of economy appear to be suspended. Third, it investigates the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics in accounting for the distribution of SELF anaphors. And finally, it makes a contribution to the literature on the so-called anaphor-agreement effect by showing that variation in the cross-linguistic occurrence of this effect strongly favours a theory of argument marking that dissociates case and agreement, as in GB-based theories of argument licensing. Chapter 1 is the introduction to the dissertation. In Chapter 2, the history of binding theory from the viewpoint of economy will be reviewed. This chapter also argues against movement approaches to the syntactic encoding of anaphoric binding and introduces an alternative. Chapter 3 aims to establish the role that pragmatic considerations such as assertive vs. presupposed reflexivity and intensification play in the distribution of morphologically complex reflexives and to discuss the relation between these proposals and alternative, syntax-based, approaches to the role of the SELF-morpheme. Then, in Chapter 4, it is discussed how binding relations can be implemented with the syntactic apparatus of Chapter 2 and also how the distribution of reflexives is affected by economy. Chapter 5 discusses the Anaphor-Agreement Effect (Rizzi 1999) and its implications for the theories of argument marking. Chapter 6 is the conclusion.