On the obligation to be rational
I formulate what I believe to be a correct account of the normativity of rationality. I identify two opposing doctrines which I call instrumentalism and rationalism. Instrumentalism says there are no obligations to be rational intrinsic to rationality, but that being rational is instrumental to doin...
Main Author: | Shackel, Nicholas |
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Published: |
University of Nottingham
2004
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.403508 |
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