Executive Labor Market Segmentation: How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance
abstract: I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incent...
Other Authors: | Zhao, Hong (Author) |
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Format: | Doctoral Thesis |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.44175 |
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