Ambiguous tipping points

Ambiguous tipping points

We analyze the policy implications of aversion to Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the possibility of tipping points. We demonstrate two channels through which uncertainty aversion affects optimal policy in the general setting. The first channel relates to the policy's effect on the prob...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Lemoine, Derek, Traeger, Christian P.
Other Authors: Department of Economics, University of Arizona
Language:en
Published: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV 2016
Subjects:
Tipping point
Ambiguity
Knightian uncertainty
Threshold
Regime shift
Climate
Hazard
Integrated assessment;
Dynamic programming
Social cost of carbon
Carbon tax
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10150/622659
http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/622659
Description
Summary:We analyze the policy implications of aversion to Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the possibility of tipping points. We demonstrate two channels through which uncertainty aversion affects optimal policy in the general setting. The first channel relates to the policy's effect on the probability of tipping, and the second channel to its differential impact in the pre- and post-tipping regimes. We then extend a recursive dynamic model of climate policy and tipping points to include uncertainty aversion. Numerically, aversion to Knightian uncertainty in the face of an ambiguous tipping point increases the optimal tax on carbon dioxide emissions, but only by a small amount.

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