GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION

• Main Authors: Gerardi, Dino, McConnell, Margaret A., Romero, Julian, Yariv, Leeat
• Other Authors: University of Arizona
• Language: en
• Published: WILEY-BLACKWELL 2016
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621936; http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/621936

We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties ( used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant ( as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes.