Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain

Watershed governance is an increasingly important policy area in the United States. Understanding what design elements of institutional arrangements tend to improve the outcomes of such governance is a major theoretical challenge. When governments cooperate at the regional level to govern shared use...

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Main Author: Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
Other Authors: Schlager, Edella
Language:en_US
Published: The University of Arizona. 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577203
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spelling ndltd-arizona.edu-oai-arizona.openrepository.com-10150-5772032015-10-23T05:47:08Z Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt Schlager, Edella Schlager, Edella Bauer, Carl Oakerson, Ronald Smith, Craig institutions natural resources watershed management Political Science governance Watershed governance is an increasingly important policy area in the United States. Understanding what design elements of institutional arrangements tend to improve the outcomes of such governance is a major theoretical challenge. When governments cooperate at the regional level to govern shared use of watersheds that cross jurisdictional boundaries, how they do so is variable. This dissertation examines an apparently successful case of watershed governance, the New York City watershed governance arrangement, to understand to what degree it is integrative and reflective of broader federal structures and processes of governance. The results support the proposition that robust regional natural resource governance in a federal bargain includes mechanisms of correcting opportunistic behaviors, responding to natural phenomena, and institutional adaptation in the face of both. 2015 text Electronic Dissertation http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577203 en_US Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. The University of Arizona.
collection NDLTD
language en_US
sources NDLTD
topic institutions
natural resources
watershed management
Political Science
governance
spellingShingle institutions
natural resources
watershed management
Political Science
governance
Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
description Watershed governance is an increasingly important policy area in the United States. Understanding what design elements of institutional arrangements tend to improve the outcomes of such governance is a major theoretical challenge. When governments cooperate at the regional level to govern shared use of watersheds that cross jurisdictional boundaries, how they do so is variable. This dissertation examines an apparently successful case of watershed governance, the New York City watershed governance arrangement, to understand to what degree it is integrative and reflective of broader federal structures and processes of governance. The results support the proposition that robust regional natural resource governance in a federal bargain includes mechanisms of correcting opportunistic behaviors, responding to natural phenomena, and institutional adaptation in the face of both.
author2 Schlager, Edella
author_facet Schlager, Edella
Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
author Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
author_sort Hanlon, Jeffrey Wyatt
title Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
title_short Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
title_full Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
title_fullStr Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
title_full_unstemmed Maintaining Robust Resource Governance: Mechanisms of Formal Institutional Change in a Federal Bargain
title_sort maintaining robust resource governance: mechanisms of formal institutional change in a federal bargain
publisher The University of Arizona.
publishDate 2015
url http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577203
work_keys_str_mv AT hanlonjeffreywyatt maintainingrobustresourcegovernancemechanismsofformalinstitutionalchangeinafederalbargain
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