Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief

This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquainta...

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Main Author: Galvani, Eve Antoinette
Other Authors: Philosophy
Format: Others
Published: Virginia Tech 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666
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spelling ndltd-VTETD-oai-vtechworks.lib.vt.edu-10919-736662020-09-29T05:45:38Z Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief Galvani, Eve Antoinette Philosophy Trogdon, Kelly Griffith McPherson, Tristram Klagge, James C. acquaintance phenomenal absences introspection privileged access beliefs This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases. Master of Arts 2016-12-12T19:11:27Z 2016-12-12T19:11:27Z 2016-06-27 Thesis vt_gsexam:7883 http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666 In Copyright http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ ETD application/pdf Virginia Tech
collection NDLTD
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic acquaintance
phenomenal absences
introspection
privileged access
beliefs
spellingShingle acquaintance
phenomenal absences
introspection
privileged access
beliefs
Galvani, Eve Antoinette
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
description This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases. === Master of Arts
author2 Philosophy
author_facet Philosophy
Galvani, Eve Antoinette
author Galvani, Eve Antoinette
author_sort Galvani, Eve Antoinette
title Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
title_short Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
title_full Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
title_fullStr Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
title_full_unstemmed Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
title_sort acquaintance and the formation of negative phenomenal belief
publisher Virginia Tech
publishDate 2016
url http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666
work_keys_str_mv AT galvanieveantoinette acquaintanceandtheformationofnegativephenomenalbelief
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