Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquainta...
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ndltd-VTETD-oai-vtechworks.lib.vt.edu-10919-736662020-09-29T05:45:38Z Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief Galvani, Eve Antoinette Philosophy Trogdon, Kelly Griffith McPherson, Tristram Klagge, James C. acquaintance phenomenal absences introspection privileged access beliefs This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases. Master of Arts 2016-12-12T19:11:27Z 2016-12-12T19:11:27Z 2016-06-27 Thesis vt_gsexam:7883 http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666 In Copyright http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ ETD application/pdf Virginia Tech |
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acquaintance phenomenal absences introspection privileged access beliefs |
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acquaintance phenomenal absences introspection privileged access beliefs Galvani, Eve Antoinette Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
description |
This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases. === Master of Arts |
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Philosophy |
author_facet |
Philosophy Galvani, Eve Antoinette |
author |
Galvani, Eve Antoinette |
author_sort |
Galvani, Eve Antoinette |
title |
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
title_short |
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
title_full |
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
title_fullStr |
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
title_full_unstemmed |
Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief |
title_sort |
acquaintance and the formation of negative phenomenal belief |
publisher |
Virginia Tech |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT galvanieveantoinette acquaintanceandtheformationofnegativephenomenalbelief |
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1719346229299642368 |