Non-propositional intentionality

• Main Author: Grzankowski, Alex Paul
• Format: Others
• Language: English
• Published: 2010
• Subjects: Intentionality; Intentional states; Propositions; Mental states; Intensional transitive verbs
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-1356

We often want to explain and predict behavior, both our own and that of others. For various reasons we want to know not only why (in the sense of etiology) someone is doing what he is, but we also have interests in understanding the agent's reasons for which he is acting as he is. Though not uncontroversial, it is common to cite intentional states when offering such explanations. Most philosophers take certain intentional states to be the causes of our actions and to play a role in accounting for the reasons for which one acts. Additionally, most theorists who adopt such a line take the relevant intentional states to be propositional attitudes, most commonly beliefs and desires (or other pro attitudes which relate one to a proposition). In many of our explanations, we do indeed cite beliefs and desires, but we also cite many other psychological states that aren't obviously beliefs or desires. In fact, some of the relevant psychological states don't even appear to be propositional attitudes. In this paper I pursue two lines of questioning, one about the explanations of action and one about intentionality. First, what role is played by these apparently non-propositional attitudes? Such attitudes turn up in Davidson's locus classicus and can be found in the most recent work on action as well, but explications are sparse. Second, are these attitudes in fact non-propositional? Despite appearances to the contrary, one might argue that such states are to be, in some way or other, assimilated to the more familiar propositional attitudes. I resist this line in the second chapter. === text