Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities

We describe a stochastic network interdiction problem in which an interdictor, subject to limited resources, installs radiation detectors at border checkpoints in a transportation network in order to minimize the probability that a smuggler of nuclear material can traverse the residual network undet...

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Main Author: Nehme, Michael Victor
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: 2010
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/2152/7512
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spelling ndltd-UTEXAS-oai-repositories.lib.utexas.edu-2152-75122015-09-20T16:53:37ZTwo-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexitiesNehme, Michael VictorStochastic network interdiction problemStackelberg gameCournot gameSmugglersSmugglingRadiation detectorsBorder checkpointsTwo-person gamesMathematical modelsWe describe a stochastic network interdiction problem in which an interdictor, subject to limited resources, installs radiation detectors at border checkpoints in a transportation network in order to minimize the probability that a smuggler of nuclear material can traverse the residual network undetected. The problems are stochastic because the smuggler's origin-destination pair, the mass and type of material being smuggled, and the level of shielding are known only through a probability distribution when the detectors are installed. We consider three variants of the problem. The first is a Stackelberg game which assumes that the smuggler chooses a maximum-reliability path through the network with full knowledge of detector locations. The second is a Cournot game in which the interdictor and the smuggler act simultaneously. The third is a "hybrid" game in which only a subset of detector locations is revealed to the smuggler. In the Stackelberg setting, the problem is NP-complete even if the interdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country. However, we can compute wait-and-see bounds in polynomial time if the interdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of the origin and destination countries. We describe mixed-integer programming formulations and customized branch-and-bound algorithms which exploit this fact, and provide computational results which show that these specialized approaches are substantially faster than more straightforward integer-programming implementations. We also present some special properties of the single-country case and a complexity landscape for this family of problems. The Cournot variant of the problem is potentially challenging as the interdictor must place a probability distribution over an exponentially-sized set of feasible detector deployments. We use the equivalence of optimization and separation to show that the problem is polynomially solvable in the single-country case if the detectors have unit installation costs. We present a row-generation algorithm and a version of the weighted majority algorithm to solve such instances. We use an exact-penalty result to formulate a model in which some detectors are visible to the smuggler and others are not. This may be appropriate to model "decoy" detectors and detector upgrades.text2010-05-27T14:20:28Z2010-05-27T14:20:28Z2009-122010-05-27T14:20:28Zelectronichttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/7512engCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Stochastic network interdiction problem
Stackelberg game
Cournot game
Smugglers
Smuggling
Radiation detectors
Border checkpoints
Two-person games
Mathematical models
spellingShingle Stochastic network interdiction problem
Stackelberg game
Cournot game
Smugglers
Smuggling
Radiation detectors
Border checkpoints
Two-person games
Mathematical models
Nehme, Michael Victor
Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
description We describe a stochastic network interdiction problem in which an interdictor, subject to limited resources, installs radiation detectors at border checkpoints in a transportation network in order to minimize the probability that a smuggler of nuclear material can traverse the residual network undetected. The problems are stochastic because the smuggler's origin-destination pair, the mass and type of material being smuggled, and the level of shielding are known only through a probability distribution when the detectors are installed. We consider three variants of the problem. The first is a Stackelberg game which assumes that the smuggler chooses a maximum-reliability path through the network with full knowledge of detector locations. The second is a Cournot game in which the interdictor and the smuggler act simultaneously. The third is a "hybrid" game in which only a subset of detector locations is revealed to the smuggler. In the Stackelberg setting, the problem is NP-complete even if the interdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country. However, we can compute wait-and-see bounds in polynomial time if the interdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of the origin and destination countries. We describe mixed-integer programming formulations and customized branch-and-bound algorithms which exploit this fact, and provide computational results which show that these specialized approaches are substantially faster than more straightforward integer-programming implementations. We also present some special properties of the single-country case and a complexity landscape for this family of problems. The Cournot variant of the problem is potentially challenging as the interdictor must place a probability distribution over an exponentially-sized set of feasible detector deployments. We use the equivalence of optimization and separation to show that the problem is polynomially solvable in the single-country case if the detectors have unit installation costs. We present a row-generation algorithm and a version of the weighted majority algorithm to solve such instances. We use an exact-penalty result to formulate a model in which some detectors are visible to the smuggler and others are not. This may be appropriate to model "decoy" detectors and detector upgrades. === text
author Nehme, Michael Victor
author_facet Nehme, Michael Victor
author_sort Nehme, Michael Victor
title Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
title_short Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
title_full Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
title_fullStr Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
title_full_unstemmed Two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
title_sort two-person games for stochastic network interdiction : models, methods, and complexities
publishDate 2010
url http://hdl.handle.net/2152/7512
work_keys_str_mv AT nehmemichaelvictor twopersongamesforstochasticnetworkinterdictionmodelsmethodsandcomplexities
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