| Summary: | The purpose of this essay is to increase the understanding of the discussion of political obligation. This concern the questions if, how, and to what extent people are required to obey state commands. More specifically the purpose is to increase the understanding of one of the topics main theories, the natural duty of justice. This account states that people have a natural duty to comply with just institutions that apply to them, independent of any voluntary actions. For this a discourse surrounding the theory has been examined and evaluated. It consists of Rawls argument for the theory, a criticism formulated by Simmons, and a defence formulated by Waldron. Rawls argues that for a just society to be stable, the natural duty of justice is necessary, and also sufficient for basing political obligations. Simmons criticises this account for dispensing of voluntary actions that he sees as necessary for political obligation. Without these, the application of just institutions is morally insignificant. Waldron then defends the account by adding additional requirements for institutions to apply, besides justice. Institutions also have to be effective, in the sense that they are able to enact justice, and legitimate in the sense that they are preferable to other alternatives. I will argue that justice of institutions is necessary but insufficient for them to apply to people. Voluntary actions like consent will also be argued to be unnecessary for institutions application to be morally significant. If institutions are not only just but also effective and legitimate, in the sense that they are the most just and effective in relation to the viable alternatives, then their application and commands has moral significance. The conclusion of this essay then is that the natural duty of justice can account for political obligations, given high demands for institutions to apply.
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