| Summary: | The Swedish corporate law scholars have long debated whether there is something similar to the American business judgment rule (BJR) in the Swedish Companies Act (SCA). Recently, the discourse shifted to claim that the BJR exists in Swedish case law and should be introduced in the SCA in the form of a statute. However, the Swedish corporate law scholars have not investigated in much detail whether the BJR should be introduced in the SCA. An eagerness to introduce the BJR might seem bewildering due to the corporate scandals at the beginning of this century and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. These events left corporate law scholars and those in the business community with the pressing question of whether the board of directors is sufficiently accountable, and the BJR appears to do the very opposite. In view of the foregoing, this thesis examines whether the BJR should be introduced in the SCA. This examination enables a comparative analysis of the liability rules of the board of directors in Sweden and Delaware, which is the dominant source of state corporate law in the United States. This thesis also steps outside traditional legal sources and considers other disciplines such as moral and political philosophy, sociology, and the methodology of law and economics. This thesis finds that the BJR does not balance the values of the authority of the board of directors and the need to hold it accountable for its decisions and actions in an appropriate manner because it allows the value of authority to completely dominate. An appropriate balance between these values of authority and accountability requires that none of the values be so preeminent that any of them completely dominate. The BJR is made more critical because the Delaware courts apply it generously in favor of the board of directors and adopt an inveterate attitude in cases raising duty of care, thus, weakening the duty of care as a viable and meaningful accountability mechanism. Given these findings, this thesis concludes that the Swedish legislator should only consider introducing the BJR in the SCA if it is articulated in a different way. Alternatively, if it is given a dual function to protect both the authority of the board of directors and the need to hold it accountable for its decisions and actions. The justifications behind the BJR do not change the conclusion because they do not fully defend the existence of the BJR and the dominance of the value of authority. This thesis also considers the benefits of introducing the BJR in the SCA, but they also do not change the overall conclusion. Instead, the conclusion is strengthened by the fact that a no liability rule can emerge when the BJR is combined with other protective devices in the SCA in the same way as it does in Delaware if the BJR is not modified or given a dual function. The no liability rule appears to deter the threat of legal liability as an effective accountability mechanism, which cannot be defended by either social norms or market forces.
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