Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection

This research studies the moderating effect of ownership concentration and the strength of investor protection on the relationship between the level of board independence, as measured by the number of non-executive directors in relation to total number of directors and the firm performance. Using a...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lipinski, Krzysztof
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377176
id ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-377176
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-3771762019-02-16T05:29:54ZBoard independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protectionengLipinski, KrzysztofUppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen2019Tobin’s QBoard IndependenceShareholder ConcentrationInvestor ProtectionBusiness AdministrationFöretagsekonomiThis research studies the moderating effect of ownership concentration and the strength of investor protection on the relationship between the level of board independence, as measured by the number of non-executive directors in relation to total number of directors and the firm performance. Using a sample of 9018 observations on all non-financial publicly listed firmsin 27 OECD countries between the year 2012 and 2015. The findings show a positive correlation between board independence and firm performancein all regression models. Furthermore, I find the negative moderating effect on both shareholder concentration and investor protection on the main relationship. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377176application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Tobin’s Q
Board Independence
Shareholder Concentration
Investor Protection
Business Administration
Företagsekonomi
spellingShingle Tobin’s Q
Board Independence
Shareholder Concentration
Investor Protection
Business Administration
Företagsekonomi
Lipinski, Krzysztof
Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
description This research studies the moderating effect of ownership concentration and the strength of investor protection on the relationship between the level of board independence, as measured by the number of non-executive directors in relation to total number of directors and the firm performance. Using a sample of 9018 observations on all non-financial publicly listed firmsin 27 OECD countries between the year 2012 and 2015. The findings show a positive correlation between board independence and firm performancein all regression models. Furthermore, I find the negative moderating effect on both shareholder concentration and investor protection on the main relationship.
author Lipinski, Krzysztof
author_facet Lipinski, Krzysztof
author_sort Lipinski, Krzysztof
title Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
title_short Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
title_full Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
title_fullStr Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
title_full_unstemmed Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
title_sort board independence and firm performance: the moderating effect of ownership concentration and shareholder protection
publisher Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen
publishDate 2019
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377176
work_keys_str_mv AT lipinskikrzysztof boardindependenceandfirmperformancethemoderatingeffectofownershipconcentrationandshareholderprotection
_version_ 1718976330751541248