Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the ot...
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ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-3535022018-06-20T05:56:25ZBeyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than BeingengSheikhi, Sara Alma SafijeUppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen2018levinasmetaphysicsdiscoursemetaphilosophyscepticismlanguage philosophyethicsotherismdialoguelevinasmetafysikdiskursmetafilosofiskepticismspråkfilosofietikdialogPhilosophyFilosofiIn Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353502application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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English |
format |
Others
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levinas metaphysics discourse metaphilosophy scepticism language philosophy ethics otherism dialogue levinas metafysik diskurs metafilosofi skepticism språkfilosofi etik dialog Philosophy Filosofi |
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levinas metaphysics discourse metaphilosophy scepticism language philosophy ethics otherism dialogue levinas metafysik diskurs metafilosofi skepticism språkfilosofi etik dialog Philosophy Filosofi Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
description |
In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful. |
author |
Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije |
author_facet |
Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije |
author_sort |
Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije |
title |
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
title_short |
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
title_full |
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
title_fullStr |
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
title_full_unstemmed |
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being |
title_sort |
beyond the betrayal of language : on the role of skepticism in otherwise than being |
publisher |
Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353502 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT sheikhisaraalmasafije beyondthebetrayaloflanguageontheroleofskepticisminotherwisethanbeing |
_version_ |
1718697890958802944 |