Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the ot...

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Main Author: Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353502
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spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-3535022018-06-20T05:56:25ZBeyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than BeingengSheikhi, Sara Alma SafijeUppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen2018levinasmetaphysicsdiscoursemetaphilosophyscepticismlanguage philosophyethicsotherismdialoguelevinasmetafysikdiskursmetafilosofiskepticismspråkfilosofietikdialogPhilosophyFilosofiIn Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353502application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic levinas
metaphysics
discourse
metaphilosophy
scepticism
language philosophy
ethics
otherism
dialogue
levinas
metafysik
diskurs
metafilosofi
skepticism
språkfilosofi
etik
dialog
Philosophy
Filosofi
spellingShingle levinas
metaphysics
discourse
metaphilosophy
scepticism
language philosophy
ethics
otherism
dialogue
levinas
metafysik
diskurs
metafilosofi
skepticism
språkfilosofi
etik
dialog
Philosophy
Filosofi
Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije
Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
description In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.
author Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije
author_facet Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije
author_sort Sheikhi, Sara Alma Safije
title Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
title_short Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
title_full Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
title_fullStr Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
title_full_unstemmed Beyond the Betrayal of Language : On the Role of Skepticism in Otherwise than Being
title_sort beyond the betrayal of language : on the role of skepticism in otherwise than being
publisher Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen
publishDate 2018
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353502
work_keys_str_mv AT sheikhisaraalmasafije beyondthebetrayaloflanguageontheroleofskepticisminotherwisethanbeing
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