| Summary: | Drawing on a theoretical framework based on securitization and threat construction, the attempt in this study was to broaden the understanding of how the perception of a Russian threat in the Baltic Sea is influencing Swedish defence and security policy. The method used was based on Bacchis WPR-approach. Three questions were asked at the beginning of this study, regardning how Russia is viewed in Sweden, how the representation of Russia has changed from the war in Georgia in 2008 until 2018, as well as how Sweden is to strengthen it's defence capacity, nationally and through cooperation, to tacle the Russian threat. Four key aspects of Russian behaviour that is considered threatening were identified. Russia is viewed as a country with power ambitions and expansionist tendencies; characterised as tactically unpredictable; looked upon as a risk calculating actor; and considered misstrusting in its views of the West. The perception of Russia is complex which creates difficulties regarding how the threat is to be met. Policy makers have urged the strengthening of Swedish national defence capacity to create a conflict threshold in the region. To further strengthen this threshold, the bilateral defence cooperation with Finland has deepened. In addition, the question of military non-alignment has been raised in relation to a possible Swedish membership in Nato. The answer to whether or not Sweden should join depends on political affiliation. This underlines the theoretical assumptions; security and defence policy is not merely a response to an external circumstance, but rather the result of an interplay between circumstance and actor.
|
|---|
