| Summary: | The standard concerning the impairment testing for goodwill is often considered to be one of the most difficult standards in IFRS to comply with, which is largely due to the subjective and complex nature of the standard. Despite, the obvious issues with the standard it has remained fairly unaltered since its implementation back in 2005. The purpose of this research was to investigate to what extent companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm comply with the disclosure requirements in IAS 36, paragraph 134. This research also intended to answer whether there is an association between the companies’ compliance level and certain company characteristics, more specifically company size, profitability, goodwill intensity and industry type. The study also considered how time affected the compliance level. We devised hypotheses for each of the company characteristics, and these were formulate with both previous research and theory in mind. The theories that were utilized in this study were the agency theory, the political cost theory and the cost-benefit theory. The hypotheses that lacked a concrete linkage to one of the theories were instead justified using the reasoning’s found in pre-existing disclosure studies. The necessary data was collected from companies’ annual reports, which we accessed from either Business Retriever or directly from the companies’ official websites. An own interpretation of IAS 36, paragraph 134 was made in order to able to assess each company on equal terms. The collected data was then transferred to a disclosure index in order to get a compliancy score for each company investigated. The empirical findings of this research showed that two out of five hypotheses were significantly associated with the companies’ compliance level. The analysis rejected hypotheses related to profitability, goodwill intensity and industry type. The findings however showed that both year and company size are associated with the compliance level. The positive association between compliance and year, implies that compliance increases as companies get more accustomed to the standard. The findings further suggest that larger companies comply better with standard because they are under more political pressure and more inclined to please their stakeholders.
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