| Summary: | Ever since the middle of the twentieth century the public sector has expanded greatly with an increasing number of civil servants. Politicians however keep getting fewer and fewer with less capability of monitoring said public sector. This creates a tension between democracy and bureaucracy that begs the question how society should adjust to these changes. How should the relationship between politicians and public servants be managed and how should responsibilities be divided between them? Too much responsibility given to public servants runs the risk of lowering chances of public transparency and accountability. Too much responsibility given to politicians may however decrease the efficiency and capability of tend-ing to the citizen’s needs in the public sector. Regardless of how the issue is approached there needs to be a formal division of responsibilities. A lack of or unclear division of responsibility will decrease citizen’s possibility of holding politicians and public officials accountable. It also helps clarify to what extent crossing the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy is allowed. A prime example of a public servant that is caught in between the opposite sides of politics and bureaucracy are city managers, who lead the municipalities along with local politicians. They serve as illustrations of how responsibility may be divided and what roles are expected of leading public servants. To study this, instructions for city managers has been used as material. The method for this study has been quantitative content analysis. The results show that city managers firstly are expected to act as "managers" inspired by New Public Management. At the same time to a rather large extent they are expected to act as "controllers", a neutral follower of political will like in traditional Weberian models for management of the public sector. This creates a contrast between an independent and pro- active city manager that prioritizes efficiency with an obedient and passive manager that prioritizes political control. Both internal administrative and political arenas become relevant, while surrounding arenas and contact with external parties are less prioritized. Political major-ities and the size of a municipality appear to have none or marginal effects on what role is preferred and how responsibility is divided.
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