Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser

Work, especially that in complex, dynamic workplaces, often requires subtle, local judgment with regard to timing of subtasks, relevance, importance, prioritization and so forth. Still, people in Nuclear Industry seem to think safety results from people just following procedures. In the wake of fail...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Engström, Diana
Format: Others
Language:Swedish
Published: Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för fysik och elektroteknik (IFE) 2015
Subjects:
CAP
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-44940
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spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-lnu-449402015-06-30T04:53:31ZAtt styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser sweEngström, DianaLinnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för fysik och elektroteknik (IFE)2015säkerhetskulturhuman performance toolsCAPCorrective action programthe black swanWork, especially that in complex, dynamic workplaces, often requires subtle, local judgment with regard to timing of subtasks, relevance, importance, prioritization and so forth. Still, people in Nuclear Industry seem to think safety results from people just following procedures. In the wake of failure it can be tempting to introduce new procedures and an even stricter "rule following culture". None, or at least very little, attention is given to tacit knowledge and individual skills. I am aiming to highlight the inadequacy of putting too much trust in formalization and that reporting and trending of events will contribute to increased learning, an increased nuclear safety and an efficient operational experience. The ability to interpret a situation concrete depends on proven experience in similar situations, analogical thinking and tacit knowledge. In this essay I intend to problematize the introduction and use of so-called Corrective Action Program (CAP) and computerized reporting systems linked to CAP in the Nuclear Industry. What I found out is that the whole industry, from regulators to licensees, seems to be stuck in the idea that the scientific perspective on knowledge is the only "true" perspective. This leads to an exaggerated belief in that technology and formalized work processes and routines will create a safer business. The computerized reporting system will not, as the idea was from the beginning, contribute to increased nuclear safety since the reports is based on the trigger and not the underlying causes and in-depth analysis. Managing safety by numbers (incidents, error counts, safety threats, and safety culture indicators) is very practical but has its limitations. Error counts only uphold an illusion of rationality and control, but may offer neither real insight nor productive routes for progress on safety. The question is why the CAP, error counts and computerized reporting systems have had such a big impact in the nuclear industry? It rests after all, on too weak foundations. The answer is that the scientific perspective on knowledge is the dominating perspective. What people do not understand is that an excessive use of computerized systems and an increased formalization actually will create new risks when people lose their skills and ability to reflect and put more trust in the system than in themselves. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-44940application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language Swedish
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic säkerhetskultur
human performance tools
CAP
Corrective action program
the black swan
spellingShingle säkerhetskultur
human performance tools
CAP
Corrective action program
the black swan
Engström, Diana
Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
description Work, especially that in complex, dynamic workplaces, often requires subtle, local judgment with regard to timing of subtasks, relevance, importance, prioritization and so forth. Still, people in Nuclear Industry seem to think safety results from people just following procedures. In the wake of failure it can be tempting to introduce new procedures and an even stricter "rule following culture". None, or at least very little, attention is given to tacit knowledge and individual skills. I am aiming to highlight the inadequacy of putting too much trust in formalization and that reporting and trending of events will contribute to increased learning, an increased nuclear safety and an efficient operational experience. The ability to interpret a situation concrete depends on proven experience in similar situations, analogical thinking and tacit knowledge. In this essay I intend to problematize the introduction and use of so-called Corrective Action Program (CAP) and computerized reporting systems linked to CAP in the Nuclear Industry. What I found out is that the whole industry, from regulators to licensees, seems to be stuck in the idea that the scientific perspective on knowledge is the only "true" perspective. This leads to an exaggerated belief in that technology and formalized work processes and routines will create a safer business. The computerized reporting system will not, as the idea was from the beginning, contribute to increased nuclear safety since the reports is based on the trigger and not the underlying causes and in-depth analysis. Managing safety by numbers (incidents, error counts, safety threats, and safety culture indicators) is very practical but has its limitations. Error counts only uphold an illusion of rationality and control, but may offer neither real insight nor productive routes for progress on safety. The question is why the CAP, error counts and computerized reporting systems have had such a big impact in the nuclear industry? It rests after all, on too weak foundations. The answer is that the scientific perspective on knowledge is the dominating perspective. What people do not understand is that an excessive use of computerized systems and an increased formalization actually will create new risks when people lose their skills and ability to reflect and put more trust in the system than in themselves.
author Engström, Diana
author_facet Engström, Diana
author_sort Engström, Diana
title Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
title_short Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
title_full Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
title_fullStr Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
title_full_unstemmed Att styra säkerhet med siffror : En essä om (att se) gränser
title_sort att styra säkerhet med siffror : en essä om (att se) gränser
publisher Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för fysik och elektroteknik (IFE)
publishDate 2015
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-44940
work_keys_str_mv AT engstromdiana attstyrasakerhetmedsiffrorenessaomattsegranser
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