Det godkända fusket : Normförhandlingar i gymnasieskolans bedömningspraktiker

• Main Author: Fonseca, Lars
• Format: Doctoral Thesis
• Language: Swedish
• Published: Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för pedagogik (PED) 2014
• Subjects: academic dishonesty; assessment; cheat; education; hidden curriculum; neoliberalism; new public management; norms; sociology of education; result-oriented management; upper secondary school; Fusk; bedömning; utbildning; dold läroplan; nyliberalism; normer; utbildningssociologi; mål- och resultatstyrning; gymnasieskola
• Online Access: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-37139; http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:isbn:978-91-87925-16-0

Education on behalf of social trust constitutes a central theme in all societies. Different forms of cheating and fraud have a negative impact on the bonds of social trust. The purpose of the thesis is to increase understanding of the scope for learning about the individual-society relationship as it finds expression in pedagogical practices involving norms relating to cheating. The established norms concerning school cheating are identified in group-based discussions involving Upper Secondary students and teachers. Students ascribe each other roles on the basis of the perceived capacity to produce school results and thereby also to justify the need for school cheating. In the norm negotiations a significant tolerance is shown towards cheating which is adjudged to be necessary, provided that a hierarchic, fair distribution of grades can be retained. The teachers perceive expectations of acting for goal fulfilment, in the form of good student grades, as based on economic arguments. Good student grades imply satisfied customers in a market exposed to competition and a strong market value for the individual school. From a critical viewpoint these norms are related to the contemporary, dominant neo-liberal principles of commercialisation and individualisation in social organisation. The school actors perceive, in accordance with stratified norm theory, the norms from economic systems of conduct as more strongly conditioning on conduct than those norms from political-administrative or socio-cultural conduct systems. The teachers are aware of expectations, in hidden concert and consent with other school stakeholders, to offer social approval for student cheating and sympathetic marking concerning the lowest grade for passing i.e. violation of rules, where this is necessary to meet the economic as well as political-administrative objectives that have been established. To be part of pedagogic practices involving school cheating implies learning to uncouple rules and practice, law and morality. Such a double agenda is incompatible with norms and ideals in official curricula as well as being destructive of the bonds of social trust; it thereby functions as a hidden curriculum.