| Summary: | In international corruption indexes, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Sweden often ranks as one of the least corrupt countries in the World. Despite this, the country still experiences corruption scandals, particularly in local government. In the wake of a scandal, municipalities tend to react swiftly and initiate anti- corruption reforms. However, despite such actions, new scandals re-emerge. The purpose of the study is to analyze why the undertaken reforms are not always successful in preventing new scandals from happening. In order to do so, I focus on anti-corruption measures in two large Swedish municipalities that have repeatedly experienced corruption scandals, despite having taken action and putting anti-corruption measures in place: the cities of Norrkoping and Gothenburg. Interviews on the scandals and the anti-corruption reforms were conducted with officials and politicians, and empirical evidence has also been gathered from public documents and audit reports. The principal-agent theory and the ideal types of “value based” and “compliance based” approaches are the theoretical tools which are used to analyze the undertaken anti-corruption reforms. The results show that the reforms undertaken indeed have improved the integrity systems of the cities. However, the reoccurring scandals can best be explained by the fact that the reforms have not been properly incorporated properly in the administrations, which in some cases have resulted in an ignorance of the rules. Some scandals can also be explained by conscious criminal acts from the agents, acts that are difficult to guard oneself against no matter how well-designed the anti-corruption institutions are. The results hence show that it is hard to design institutions that obliterate the corruption that are undertaken on purpose by agents.
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