Utbildningssystemets dilemma : Balansen mellan politisk kontroll och professionell autonomi

• Main Author: Lidsten, Christopher
• Format: Others
• Language: Swedish
• Published: Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk och industriell utveckling 2018
• Subjects: Street-level bureaucrats; agency problem; decentralization; control; autonomy; Political Science; Statsvetenskap
• Online Access: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-148737

The purpose of this thesis was to get a deeper comprehension of how Swedish schools are affected by institutional change, what influence eventual governmental intervention has on the professional autonomy of street-level bureaucrats and towards which direction the educational system is heading.   As a theoretical frame of reference, the study used two primary theories. The first theory consists of a classical work in political science – the theory of street-level bureaucracies by Michael Lipsky. Its insightful pondering on public service workers as policy decisionmakers served as a tool to better understand the crucial part that street-level bureaucrats play in the political game. The second theory is the principal-agent theorem. With its assumtions grounded in rational choice, it aims to explain the agency problem, which occurs when the agent is acting in his own best interest. The principal-agent theory was used in order to explain why the government could have an increased need for control and surveillance. Through empirical evidence, the study found that decentralization leads to an increased governmental need for control and surveillance over Swedish schools. Furthermore, the study found that governmental intervention has a negative impact on the professional autonomy of street-level bureaucrats. The actions taken by the government is indicative of an attempt to strengthen the control of goal fulfillment. Thus, the study concludes that the educational system is heading towards a situation with more political control and less professional autonomy.