| Summary: | The historic tension between military experts and political sovereignty over the armed forces continues to dog the field of civil-military relations. History has shown us that some politicians are more than willing to interfere in military operation as well as military officers are willing to act on the political scene. This study combines theories of traditional War Science with those of Political Administration studies and by doing so it tackles the phenomenon from different angles providing new insights. Being able to provide this approach is useful for future studies within the field. By comparing Denmark´s and Sweden´s contribution to multinational military operations in Afghanistan, following the terrorist attack on September the 11th 2001, this study highlights the institutional autonomy of the forces contributed in relation to military effectiveness over both a short and long term perspective. By doing so the method applied identifies interesting empirical variations as well as changes over time in the two countries examined. This study provides valuable insights into the practises of military power in a world characterized by significant changes in security threats which constitutes another important purpose of this study. The area of research is complex and causality is somewhat elusive, however this study clearly shows a co-variation and that Sweden has been more reluctant to release autonomy to its troops than Denmark. It also addresses the extensive cost both in human and capability terms when working in complex environments, and with the aim to reach ambitious security political goals in the endeavour to be militarily effective.
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