| Summary: | This thesis approaches the reasons behind the success of insurgencies in conflicts against greater nations. Why is it that a small group with limited resources can triumph against a great military power. This study seeks to analyze the conflicts in Afghanistan 1979-1989 and Chechnya 1994-1996 with the use of an adapted version of the SWORD-model in order to conclude whether the model can elucidate the separate outcomes. The original model is based on seven dimensions which all explains different aspects on how a state ought to combat insurgents in order to succeed, and has predominantly been used to analyze conflicts involving the US, not Russia or the USSR. A case study is then realized on the two conflicts in order to strengthen or weaken the analytic prowess of the adapted SWORD-model. The analysis concludes that the insurgents had the advantage in four and three respectively, out of the four adapted dimensions in Afghanistan and Chechnya, which indicates that the insurgents should have succeed in both conflicts which they did. Based on this, it can be argued that the analytic power of the adapted SWORD-model has been strengthened by explaining two additional partly unique conflicts involving alternative states.
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