Den nekande operationskonsten i Bosnien och Kosovo

• Main Author: Darnolf-Lindskog, Nic
• Format: Others
• Language: Swedish
• Published: Försvarshögskolan 2017
• Subjects: ugoslavien; Operation Deliberate Force; Operation Allied Force; Bosnien; Kosovo; Tvångsmakt; Luftoperation; Nato; Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified; Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap
• Online Access: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-6814

The two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo named Deliberate Force and Allied Force took place in 1995 and 1999. Both operations show clear signs that the use of air power was the main contributor to the outcome of the operations. Earlier research states that there are signs of coercive air power in both of these operations but fail to explain in what way. The purpose of this essay is to examine if Robert A. Papes theory about denial strategy in air operations can explain the different outcomes of the operations as the operation in Bosnia took 21 days and the operation in Kosovo took 78 days to reach its designated goals. This essay will also test Papes Theory on what constitutes a successful air campaign by comparing the two operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The result supports Papes theory and shows that operation Deliberate Force acted according to Papes theory on denial in five out of six parts, excluding the strategic interdiction. Whereas operation Allied Force acted according to the theory as well but in a smaller extent. It can be argued that there are other background factors that also contributed to the outcome of the operations but by looking at the usage of the air power in both operations it shows that by acting accordingly to Papes theory the outcome was a success. By supporting Papes theory this essay adds to the earlier research a wider knowledge about coercive air power in military interventions. === <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>