Rawlsian justice: a philosophical justification for conservation?
The natural environment is commonly managed in order to maximize economic returns; a criterion that is seldom consistent with conservation of nature or natural resources. Yet, it is common for people to claim that conservation constitutes a legitimate constraint on economic returns. More specific...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/2429/8260 |
| Summary: | The natural environment is commonly managed in order to maximize
economic returns; a criterion that is seldom consistent with conservation of nature
or natural resources. Yet, it is common for people to claim that conservation
constitutes a legitimate constraint on economic returns. More specifically, authors
commonly apply political theory in support of the claim that it is unjust not to
conserve. This thesis evaluates a) the adequacy of particular attempts to justify
conservation using applications of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice and b) the
general ability of Rawls' framework to support conservation. The theory fails to
provide a strong justification of conservation policies and practices because of both
questionable efforts to extrapolate from the theory, and certain fundamental
limitations of the theory itself. === Forestry, Faculty of === Graduate |
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