| Summary: | This dissertation addresses three topics in the domain of operations management.
First we study the problem of profit allocation in a supply chain using a bargaining
approach. We present a novel framework for the analysis of this problem.
The application of our framework results in a prescription for the required profit
allocations. We prove that in a setting where all supply chain agents can communicate,
possibly coordinating their actions, the allocation prescribed by our bargaining
framework coincides with the Shapley value of a cooperative game associated
with the setting. Next, we study revenue management in the presence of strategic
consumers, who face some uncertainty regarding the product valuation. We show,
contradictory to the main stream of the literature regarding strategic consumers,
that under certain circumstances, the retailer may prefer facing strategic consumers
rather than myopic ones. Finally, we study the issue of cross-dock operations management
at a shift-level. We target the main gap identified in the literature for this
issue, and present a holistic framework for the allocation of cross-dock resources
to processing of containers and freight. We show, using simulated data that our
approach outperforms current practices. === Business, Sauder School of === Graduate
|
|---|
